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decades. Under authoritarian rule in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, a sparse 
group of human rights lawyers defended the rights of political prisoners and 
laborers. With transition to democracy beginning in 1987, these lawyers formed 
a professional affiliation called Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun). 
As citizens’ groups and social movements blossomed in the 1990s, civic-minded 
lawyers began to support more specific causes such as women’s rights, 
consumer protection, environmentalism and economic justice. In 2002, Roh 
Moo-hyun, a Minbyun lawyer was elected President. However, public interest 
lawyers appear to have faded from public view since the advent of a liberal-
democratic administration. 
 
This Article asks a number of questions with respect to the transformation of 
public interest lawyers from the 1990s to date. What makes a “public interest 
lawyer” in South Korean society? What role do they have in public interest law 
groups? What new implications have arisen for public interest lawyers during 
and after a reformist government? Why does it appear that public interest 
lawyers have faded from public view? This research intends to show that public 
interest lawyers in South Korea have gained social and political empowerment 
during the democratization process, and thus have become more effective, 
lower-profile institution-builders with respect to advancing the practice of 
public interest law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The South Korean legal profession is in the midst of upheaval.  
Starting in spring 2009, legal education must take place at graduate law 
schools instead of at the college level and the Supreme Court-managed 
Judicial Research and Training Institute for those who pass the national 
judicial exam.  Presidential judicial reform committees in past 
administrations had pushed for an increase in the number of legal 
professionals and for three-year graduate legal education partly in 
response to public perception that access to legal services was 
inadequate.
1
  This proposal finally became reality when legislation 
passed to transform twenty-five undergraduate law colleges to three-year 
graduate law schools throughout the nation, averaging between forty to 
150 students per school.
2
  Among the ongoing transformations of the 
Korean legal profession, the changing role of public interest lawyers has 
yet to be analyzed.  As the legal profession undergoes changes in 
training and size, this is an opportune time to investigate the impact that 
public interest lawyers have had in Korean society. 
 In the first several decades of South Korea’s existence after the 
Korean War (1950-53), lawyers who fought for social and political 
causes numbered in the dozens only.  Although they were a minority 
within the legal profession, these lawyers maintained a relatively high 
profile as “human rights lawyers” for defending political prisoners or 
striking laborers in opposition to the state, especially under the 
authoritarian rules of Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan 
(1980-1988).  Under succeeding civilian administrations, many of these 
same lawyers grouped under the banner of Lawyers for a Democratic 
Society (Minjusahoe-reul uihan byeonhosa-moim, or Minbyun) to 
 
1  Globalization Promotion Committee, Survey Results of 9ationals Regarding 
Judicial Reform, in GLOBALIZATION OF LEGAL SERVICE AND LEGAL EDUCATION, at 12, 528 
(1995). 
2 Act on the Establishment and Operation of Graduate Law Schools, Law No. 8544 
(2007).  A phase-out period will continue for a few years so that students currently 
enrolled in law colleges may still take the existing judicial exam and receive training at 
the Judicial Research and Training Institute. 
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continue to defend the rights of those deemed in violation of the National 
Security Law or were protesting their working conditions.  As 
democratization progressed under the presidency of Kim Dae-jung 
(1998-2003), Minbyun lawyers aligned themselves with visible social 
movement groups such as the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
(CCEJ), Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), 
Green Korea United, and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy (PSPD, or Chamyeoyeondae).  Many of the same lawyers 
continued to connect with citizen advocacy organizations during the 
liberal reformist government of Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), himself a 
former Minbyun attorney. 
 Although the activities of public interest lawyers had been 
domestically reported over the decades in South Korea,
3
 their 
institutional impact on the reconfigurations of state, market and civil 
society has not been explored in depth.
4
  How have Korean lawyers 
mobilized institutions for social reform?  The dynamics of public 
interest lawyering in South Korea can be better understood by 
determining how public interest lawyers have allied with social 
movements and built institutions through networks to consolidate their 
power and agenda. 
 This Article traces the evolving roles of Korean public interest 
lawyers throughout the past twenty years to understand how Korean 
lawyers have mobilized movements and institutions for social reform.  
First, the relatively new concept of cause lawyering is tested in its 
application to the South Korean legal profession.  Second, an overview 
of the Korean legal profession provides context to the role and 
emergence of the Korean public interest lawyer.  Next, the evolving 
roles of public interest lawyers as dissidents, institution-builders, and 
lawyer-statespersons are examined in order to answer several important 
questions:  Who are the public interest lawyers in South Korea?  What 
has been their traditional identity in South Korea?  Where are they 
 
3 See generally MINBYUN BAEKSEO: MINBYEON 10 NYEON-UI BALJACHWI [MINBYUN 
WHITE PAPER: 10 YEARS OF MINBYUN FOOTPRINTS] (1998) (chronicling the history of the 
Minbyun). 
4 Socio-legal scholar Terence Halliday argues that lawyers should be viewed as 
agents and principals who help shape the institutions they are in.  Terence C. Halliday, 
Lawyers as Institution Builders: Constructing Markets, States, Civil Society, and 
Community, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES:  TRADITIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN LAW AND 
SOCIETY RESEARCH 242, 244-46 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). 
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ideologically located within the legal profession and within Korean 
society?  And how and why has their profile changed under the liberal 
reformist administration during 2003-2008?  The Article concludes with 
the recent state of public interest lawyering in South Korea and the 
challenges ahead in improving the course of public interest law.  
Ultimately, this research illustrates that public interest lawyers in South 
Korea have gained social and political empowerment during the 
democratization process, and thus have become more effective 
institution-builders with respect to advancing their social and political 
causes in the past two decades. 
 
II. “CAUSE LAWYER” V. “PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYER” 
 
 Initially, I must justify the use of the term “public interest lawyer” 
given the recent popularity of the term “cause lawyer.”  Under a 
working group project of the Law and Society Association, political 
scientists Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold have edited and authored a 
series of volumes on cause lawyering.
5
  Sarat and Scheingold eschew 
the label “public interest lawyer” because it invites disputation “over 
what is, or is not, in the public interest,” a slippery concept in itself.
6
  
They coin the term “cause lawyering” because “[i]t conveys a 
determination to take sides in political and moral struggles without 
making distinctions between worthy and unworthy causes.”
7
  Yet 
defining “cause lawyering” is not straightforward either.  To start with, 
Sarat and Scheingold admit the impossibility of providing a single, 
global definition and to think of cause lawyering as a dynamic concept in 
continuous reinvention.
8
  The closest definition I find is this: “[a]t its 
core, cause lawyering is about using legal skills to pursue ends and ideals 
that transcend client service—be those ideals social, cultural, political, 
 
5 CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold, eds., 2001) [hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE]; CAUSE 
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin 
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., 1998) [hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING]; STUART A. 
SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, 
AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004) [hereinafter SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN]. 
6 SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 5, at 5. 
7 Id. 
8 Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of the 
Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 5, at 3, 5. 
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economic, or, indeed, legal.”
9
  The authors concede that studying cause 
lawyering is problematic in terms of both definition and concept.
10
  In 
fact, one example would be that the definition does not distinguish 
between a cause lawyer or a public interest lawyer, or, for that matter, an 
activist lawyer, radical lawyer, protest lawyer, rebellious lawyer, 
progressive lawyer, civil rights lawyer or social justice lawyer.
11
  Thus, 
“cause lawyer” can be viewed as largely synonymous with the rest of the 
more conventional titles. 
 The difficulty of using the term “cause lawyer” becomes quickly 
apparent when applying it outside the American system.  In South 
Korea, there is no such thing as a “cause lawyer.”  The closest thing 
South Korea has to cause lawyers are “human rights lawyers” (in-gwon 
byeonhosa), also arguably translated as “civil rights lawyers,”
12
 under 
which labor and defense lawyers are usually categorized, and the new, 
locally minted phrase translated directly as “public interest lawyer” 
(gong-ik byeonhosa).  In-gwon byeonhosa was the dominant label in 
years past, especially under authoritarian regimes, but the phrase has 
become less relevant with successive governments more conscientious 
about rights protection, and rights protection diversifying into various 
areas such as consumer protection, economic justice and environmental 
protection.  The more generic job title of “lawyer” (byeonhosa) has 
been used to describe generally any lawyer assisting a citizens’ advocacy 
group, while gong-ik byeonhosa arrived with the recent creation of a 
public interest law firm, Gong-Gam.
13
  Importantly, the transformation 
in label demonstrates a change in the nature of public-oriented lawyers in 
South Korea, a shift barely noted in law and society literature. 
 
9
 SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN, supra note 5, at 3 (citation omitted). 
10 Id. 
11 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering:  Toward an 
Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE 
LAWYERING, supra note 5, at 31, 33 (reviewing literature and finding various labels 
applied to cause lawyers). 
12 Although in-gwon byeonhosa is more frequently translated as “human rights 
lawyer” than “civil rights lawyer,” one Korean legal scholar argues that the latter is the 
more accurate translation because lawyers advocating on behalf of defendants during 
authoritarian rule were invoking the rights of citizens under the South Korean 
Constitution rather than from an international standard of human rights.  Interview with 
Professor of Korean Law, in Santa Clara, Cal. (Apr. 21, 2005) (on file with author). 
13 See generally Korean Public Interest Lawyers’ Group, Gong-Gam, Aboout Us 
[sic], http://www.kpil.org/eng/who/about.php (last visited May 10, 2009) (giving brief 
history of Gong-Gam). 
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 The history of public interest lawyering in South Korea also does not 
extend as deeply or as broadly as in the American tradition.
14
  Given its 
civil law custom, South Korea has had a very small and tightly controlled 
cadre of legal professionals.  The government continues to set the 
annual bar passage rate and to train them in the Judicial Research and 
Training Institute (JRTI), at least until the new law school system comes 
into full implementation.  Until the 1990s, most successful bar 
applicants preferred higher status positions as judges or prosecutors 
rather than as private lawyers.
15
  Career paths as lawyers, judges or 
prosecutors were largely pre-determined by the grades one received at 
the JRTI.
16
  Since most legal professionals have historically served the 
state, their employer, few dared to oppose state-perpetrated violations 
under the military rule of Presidents Park and Chun.  The few lawyers 
who did so at the time are now considered the first generation of in-gwon 
byeonhosa. 
 Additionally, there is the problem of restricting “cause lawyering” to 
lawyers.  In the United States, one is foremost an attorney, so that 
becoming a judge, prosecutor or law professor does not preclude that 
title.  In South Korea, one has had to choose upon graduation from the 
JRTI whether to become a judge, prosecutor or lawyer, while the 
majority of those opting for a career in legal academia do not take or pass 
the bar exam.
17
  Retiring judges or prosecutors can then practice as 
lawyers, but rarely does it happen the other way around.  It would be 
safe to say that lawyers do the majority of public interest lawyering in 
South Korea.  Nevertheless, the phrase “cause lawyering” or “public 
interest lawyering” needs to be used conscientiously in the South Korean 
context so that the legal activities of legal professionals who are not 
lawyers (byeonhosa) may also be considered. 
 Despite labeling issues, the project on cause lawyering has many 
merits.  The Cause Lawyering volumes present a collection of articles 
 
14 Sarat and Scheingold recognize that different legal traditions account for varying 
scopes of cause lawyering.  See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 8, at 6 (noting 
differences between roles of lawyers in, for example, civil law and common law legal 
traditions). 
15 Yoon Dae-Kyu, The Paralysis of Legal Education in Korea, in LEGAL REFORM IN 
KOREA 36, 43 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2004).  
16 Id. 
17 Dai-kwon Choi, A Legal Profession in Transformation:  The Korean Experience, 
in REORGANISATION AND RESISTANCE: LEGAL PROFESSIONS CONFRONT A CHANGING 
WORLD 171, 174 (William LF Felstiner ed., 2005). 
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that frame many different aspects of public interest lawyering and help to 
identify strong, reemerging themes with respect to public interest 
lawyering, such as self-perception issues, the location of public interest 
lawyers, their help and hindrance to social movements and citizen 
advocacy groups, transnational alliance, and the differences in public 
interest lawyering against a repressive state or within a maturing 
democracy.  I reference some of these works throughout this article as 
they relate to the South Korean legal profession. 
 In the end, I agree with Sarat and Scheingold’s definition more than I 
do with their labeling.  While the Korean legal system provides specific 
labels of “human rights lawyer” and the newer title of “public interest 
lawyer,” I prefer to use the phrase of “public interest lawyer” or even 
“activist lawyer” in a broad sense to capture the spectrum of lawyers who 
have worked on various social and political reform issues.  For the 
reasons stated above, I use “public interest lawyering” to mean, in the 
most general sense, the use of legal means to help achieve a social cause, 
and “public interest lawyer” as a lawyer who employs legal means to 
help achieve a social cause. 
 
III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYER IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
 
 The South Korean legal profession has an interesting and important 
role within civil society given its direct connection to law and legal 
reform generally.  After all, the architects and implementers of laws are 
not just legislators and government agencies, but lawyers, prosecutors, 
judges and legal scholars.  Legal professionals are the ones who can 
decipher the laws for the public, but they are also the ones to initiate 
practical changes in the law to reflect the demands of the public.  Given 
the “gatekeeping” role of lawyers to legal discourse and activities,
18
 the 
role of lawyers can be instrumental in the mobilization of law by citizen 
advocacy organizations.  Thus the question at hand is:  what roles have 
public interest lawyers played in representing the concerns of South 
Korean civil society?  We cannot reach the answer without first 
understanding the make-up of the legal profession as it relates to Korean 
society generally; only after we understand this infrastructure can we see 
 
18 See generally, Donald J. Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 
133 (1973) (describing lawyers’ various gatekeeping roles in public and private law). 
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how public interest lawyers have distinguished themselves from the rest 
of the legal profession in partnering with citizen movement 
organizations. 
 The South Korean legal profession, regulated by competitive law 
school entrance exams and stringent bar exam requirements, has 
historically comprised a small but very elite group.
19
 This group was 
government-trained in the Korean civil law tradition, leading one to that 
the legal profession would not structurally permit much room for public 
interest lawyers who might champion causes against the government.  
After passing the rigorous bar exam usually taken after law school 
studies, successful applicants historically studied and trained for two 
years in the Judicial Research and Training Institute before choosing a 
career as judge, prosecutor or lawyer.
20
  Before 1981, JRTI graduates 
generally found jobs as judges or prosecutors,
21
  leaving only a small 
group of retirees to enter private practice.
22
  Thus, judges and 
prosecutors, who were located within the state, made up the majority of 
Korean legal professionals.  Beginning in 1981, however, the bar 
passage quota was raised from 100 to 300 persons; then again from about 
1996 to 2002 this quota was increased by about 100 annually.
23
  Thus, 
in the 1981-1995 period, about one-third of the yearly JRTI graduates 
found positions in the courts or public prosecutor’s office, leaving two-
thirds to private practice on an annual basis.
24
  The yearly quota for bar 
passage is currently about 1,000, which amounts to just over three 
percent of bar applicants passing; of those, one-fifth can be hired by 
courts or prosecutors, and the remaining four-fifths enter private 
practice.
25
 
 The bar exam and JRTI training process are indicative of two major 
traditional characteristics of the Korean legal profession:  state service 
and elitism.  The trait of state service is changing, however.  With the 
number of attorneys increasing, in recent years only one-fifth of JRTI 
 
19 See Choi, supra note 17, at 175 and tbl. 2 (discussing small size of Korean legal 
profession, defined to exclude academics, and showing historical numbers of legal 
professionals); Yoon, supra note 15, at 39 (“Korean legal professionals enjoy prestigious 
respect and power while in office, and financial affluence while in private practice.”). 
20 Choi, supra note 17, at 174. 
21 Yoon, supra note 15, at 37. 
22 DAE-KYU YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 131 (1990). 
23 Yoon, supra note 15, at 38-39. 
24 Id. at 37. 
25 Id. at 40 and tbl. 3.2. 
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graduates find positions as judges or prosecutors, compared to at least 
one-third a decade ago and everybody two decades ago.
26
  Normally, 
judicial trainees have viewed judgeship and prosecutor positions as first 
and second tier choices, while becoming a private attorney has been 
almost the default position for those who did not get the top grades 
necessary to secure one of the former positions.  However, attaining a 
position in a prestigious law firm has become another attractive option, 
in part due to lucrative salaries.
27
  Transactional commercial practice is 
also another inviting field for those not interested in courtroom litigation 
or prosecution.  Regardless of motivating factors, the increased bar 
passage rate means that the majority of JRTI trainees must now seek jobs 
in the private sector.  The one exception is that lawyers are now 
entering state service in executive and legislative capacity rather than in 
the judicial branch, which will be discussed more in Part VI. 
 On the other hand, the elitist personality of the legal profession has 
changed very little.  Although law school and bar exams are merit-
based in that basically anyone can take the exam (with the pre-
qualification now that 35 law-school subject credits must first be 
obtained), special status is immediately conferred upon entering law 
school and especially on passing the bar exam.  Alumni relations at 
both the law school and JRTI levels create a special club of legal 
members, especially considering that most JRTI candidates graduate 
from the same schools.
28
  Seoul National University Law College is the 
most prominent in that nearly half of the JRTI candidates graduate from 
there,
29
 while other law colleges like Koryo, Yonsei, Sungkyunkwan and 
Hanyang law colleges follow.  Thus, legal scholars claim that the 
Korean legal profession suffers from a “guild mentality.”
30
  Legal 
scholar James West also noted the importance of graduating with an 
LL.B. from Seoul National University: 
 
26 Id. 
27 See id. at 39 (noting that “practicing lawyers [were guaranteed] large incomes and 
affluence” because of scarcity). 
28  Cf, Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, International Strategies and Local 
Transformations: Preliminary Observations of the Position of Law in the Field of State 
Power in Asia: South Korea, in RAISING THE BAR:  THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
ASIA 81, 94-96 (William P. Alford ed., 2007) (noting that imbedded hierarchy of legal 
professionals’ status begins in feeder high schools). 
29 Jae Won Kim, The Ideal and the Reality of the Korean Legal Profession, 2 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 45, 49 n. 20 and accompanying text (2001). 
30 Id. at 51; Dae-Kyu, supra note 19, at 36, 45. 
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Failure to obtain admission to the law department of SNU already 
entails that one’s expectation of passing the bar is dramatically 
diminished.  Even if the odds are beaten after graduation from a less 
august university, one’s career opportunities may be prejudiced by 
permanent exclusion from the SNU alumni network that for many years 
operated almost as a nomenklatura of the Korean legal profession, 
linking judges, prosecutors and lawyers to overlapping alumni 
networks in the higher civil service and in the private sector.
31
 
Thus, it is not difficult to understand the phenomenon of this “old boy’s 
network” when looking at the set-up and make-up of the legal profession.  
By 2006, for a South Korean population of 48 million people, there were 
only about 7600 attorneys;
32
 in 2003, there were about 2000 judges and 
1500 prosecutors.
33
  Law professors average almost 1000 nationwide.
34
  
While law professors are not usually included as being part of the legal 
profession since they usually do not take the bar (although a small 
number have),
35
 their role in legal education and law reform necessitates 
that they be included within the category of legal professionals. 
 The Korean legal profession has traditionally been a male-saturated 
field, though that is beginning to change with greater female 
representation being achieved in recent years.  Before 1981, only one 
woman passed the bar annually, if that.
36
  In 2000, 151 women passed, 
amounting to about 19% of all successful bar applicants.
37
  In 2002, 
about 24% of those passing the bar were women, while female lawyers 
represented 5.5% of all practicing attorneys.
38
  The percentage is higher 
in the judiciary where female judges represent 8% of all judges, and they 
are gaining further ground considering that in 2003 women made up 90 
 
31 JAMES WEST, LEGAL EDUCATION IN KOREA 26 (1991). 
32 This figure was computed by adding the numbers of lawyers from each city 
district in South Korea as listed on the homepage of the Korean Bar Association’s 
website, at Korean Bar Association, http://www.koreanbar.or.kr (last visited May 10, 
2009).  If one includes “associate” bar members, the number is higher at 8,381.  
However, the author opts for the more conservative figure under the assumption that 
“associate” members may not be actively practicing as lawyers.  In 2003, the number of 
private attorneys was 5915. Yoon, supra note 15, at 41. 
33 Yoon, supra note 15, at 41. 
34 Choi, supra note 17, at 175. 
35 Id. 
36 Kim, supra note 29, at 49. 
37 Id. at 50; Choi, supra note 17, at 183. 
38 Choi, supra note 17, at 175, 183. 
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out of 224 apprentice judges,
39
 and that by 2007 they held 104 out of 
187 judicial apprenticeships.
40
  Meanwhile, more women are entering 
law schools, but women on law faculties are extremely underrepresented.  
Seoul National University hired its first female law professor in August 
2003, with other law colleges like Korea University and Sungkyunkwan 
University following suit in only the past two years.  Because there are 
very few female law professors to hire to begin with, universities face 
challenges gaining more female representation on law faculties. 
 These factors of prestige, alumni origin and gender imbalance all 
raise the issue of whether legal elites can adequately serve the interests of 
the public.  Traditionally, civil servants by virtue of their positions were 
considered to be in service of the public by fulfilling their state duties.  
The majority of legal professionals (i.e., judges and prosecutors) were 
public servants until the 1990s.  Compulsory military service for males 
also falls under public service.  Under the Public Service Advocates Act 
of 1994, male JRTI graduates who have not fulfilled their military 
service typically work at legal aid agencies to meet this requirement.
41
   
 Outside working in the capacity of judge or prosecutor, the public 
service ethic has not been the norm for legal professionals.  This may be 
changing, however. As of 2000, the Attorney-at-Law Act requires a 
certain number of hours of pro bono work as stipulated by the Korean 
Bar Association,
42
 currently set at thirty hours annually.
43
  Furthermore, 
the South Korean government and bar associations have also organized 
settings for lawyers to work on behalf of underrepresented groups like 
the poor or foreign workers.  The Korea Legal Aid Corporation is a 
prominent example.  Under the Legal Aid Act of 1987, the government 
established and funds the private, nonprofit corporation for people in 
need.
44
  However, with only one lawyer for every 6300 citizens, and 
with judges and prosecutors overwhelmed with their caseloads, it is a 
 
39 Id. at 184 tbl. 2. 
40 Byun Sun-goo, 9ew Faces of Justice, JOONGANG DAILY, Feb. 22, 2007, available at . 
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2872663 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
41 Public Service Advocates Act, Law No. 4836 (Dec. 31, 1994). 
42 Attorney-at-Law Act, Law No. 1154 (Sep. 24, 1962), amended by Law No. 6207, 
art. 27 (Jan. 28, 2000). 
43 Korean Bar Association’s Provisions on Public Interest Activity, art. 3(1).  Local 
bar associations have the option to reduce the requirement to 20 hours, though, as the 
Seoul Bar Association has done. Korean Bar Association Regulations, art. 9(20). 
44 Legal Aid Act, Law No. 3862 (Dec. 23, 1986), amended by Law No. 4837, (Dec. 
31, 1994). 
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serious issue whether average Korean citizens really have adequate 
access to the law. 
 There is no straightforward answer to the question of what the legal 
profession’s role is in South Korean civil society.  Legal professionals, 
including lawyers, prosecutors, judges, law professors and other legal 
staff, are found in public and private sectors, and cut across the state-
society divide in general.  For example, judges and prosecutors are civil 
servants and may transfer to private practice later, while attorneys and 
legal staff can be found working in private and/or public capacity, either 
in law firms, legal aid agencies or other special interest groups.  
Meanwhile, law professors can be located in public or private 
universities but may serve as consultants to the government, businesses 
or non-governmental organizations.  Thus, the role of the legal 
profession within civil society is multifaceted.  But I now focus the 
discussion on those lawyers who have advocated behalf of citizens with 
grievances, in many cases against the state, to see how they have 
achieved social and legal reform. 
 
IV. “HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS” AS DISSIDENTS 
 
 During authoritarian rule under successive presidents Park Chung-
hee and Chun Doo-hwan, a small group of human rights lawyers (in-
gwon byeonhosa) consistently defended political prisoners and striking 
laborers.  For these several decades, South Koreans understood the law 
to be an extension of state power.
45
  One primary example was 
President Park’s Yusin doctrine enacted by constitutional amendment in 
1972, which gave the President essentially unconstrained power to rule 
without judicial or legislative checks.
46
  During his administrations, 
lawyers who defended dissidents were themselves labeled as such by the 
state.  These included key figures like Yi Byeong-nin, Han Seung-heon 
and Cho Yeong-nae to name a few.
47
  These individuals were especially 
noted for their advocacy of students and workers who had been detained 
in large-scale arrests and prosecuted by the state for violating laws on 
 
45 YOON, supra note 22, at 200. 
46 See YUSIN HEONBEOP [RESTORATION CONSTITUTION] (1972) (making eligibility 
for president so stringent that Park was essentially the only eligible candidate). 
47  See generally PARK WON-SUN, YEOKSA GA IDEUL EUL MUJOE RO HARIRA 
[HISTORY SHALL ACQUIT THEM] 76-131 (2003). 
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national security and assembly.
48
 
 After Park was assassinated in 1979, mounting public protests in the 
next republic led to the watershed year of 1987.
49
  In response to citizen 
demands, Chun’s successor, Roh Tae-woo, amended the Constitution 
with the opposition party to include direct elections, a single five-year 
presidential term, more legislative powers, more individual guarantees 
and the establishment of a Constitutional Court.
50
  Within a year, around 
50 human rights lawyers formed the Lawyers for a Democratic Society 
(Minbyun).
51
  At this time, Minbyun’s main area of focus was human (or 
civil) rights protection, especially defending those the government 
abused under the pretext of the National Security Law or laborers who 
protested their working conditions.
52
  Between 1988 and 1994, forty 
percent of Minbyun’s cases (over 580 in total) dealt with the National 
Security Law or the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations.
53
 
 On the whole, these lawyers were an anomaly within the legal 
profession.  Representing political prisoners or laborers, these lawyers 
were stigmatized as troublemakers or even pro-communist by the state.
54
  
Furthermore, despite the transition to democracy in the late 1980s, the 
“misfit” label lingered well into the early 1990s, as noted by Korean 
legal scholar Ahn Kyong-whan: 
[The Ministry of Justice] claims that many “dissident lawyers” are the 
byproducts of the desperate competition among Institute graduates, and 
it is therefore desirable to take preventative measures to avoid the 
production of these “undesirable” dissident lawyers. Their reasoning is 
that these young civil rights lawyers are unsuccessful applicants for 
jobs as judges or public prosecutors. It seems to be based on the 
assumption that unemployment among intellectuals is the prime cause 
 
48 Id. at 181. 
49 See e.g., Jang Jip Choi, Political Cleavages in South Korea, in STATE AND 
SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREA 13, 37-40 (Hagen Koo ed., 1993) (discussing political 
and historical context of 1987 uprisings). 
50 See DAEHANMINGUK HEONBEOP [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA] 
(1987), translated at http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/republic.jsp (last 
visited May 10, 2009); see also YOON, supra note 22, at 96-106 (summarizing the 
different constitutions of the South Korean republics). 
51 IAN NEARY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN 84 (2002). 
52 See generally MINBYUN WHITE PAPER, supra note 3 at 15-71 (discussing early 
history of Minbyun). 
53 NEARY, supra note 51, at 85. 
54 PARK, supra note 47, at 18. 
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of social disturbances.
55
 
Human rights lawyers during the administrations of Park and Chun did, 
however, find institutional refuge within the Korean Bar Association by 
acting as members of its Human Rights Committee.
56
  It was in fact Yi 
Pyeong-nin, one of the human rights lawyers mentioned above, who had 
headed both the Korean Bar Association and Seoul Bar Association for 
consecutive terms during the late 1950s and through the 1960s.
57
  In the 
early years of Minbyun, its members spoke frequently as representatives 
of the Human Rights Committee of the Korean Bar Association because 
this offered more institutional legitimacy.
58
  As Minbyun gained its own 
reputation this became less necessary. 
 In 2007, Minbyun had 550 members.
59
  This represents about seven 
percent of the attorney population of about 8,000 in the same year.
60
  
Women account for 10 percent of Minbyun membership, which is a 
greater proportion than the percentage of women in the legal profession 
overall.
61
  Membership includes any attorney who works part-time (or 
even less) on social justice issues, so the number of those who work full-
time voluntarily on social movement causes would be considerably less.  
Although many public interest lawyers are concentrated in Minbyun, it 
should be remembered that this is a professional association and that 
most of its members work in either small or large practices and offer 
their services on a pro bono basis.
62
  Furthermore, Minbyun does not 
necessarily have a monopoly on public interest lawyers because some 
 
55 Kyong Whan Ahn, The Growth of the Bar and the Changes in the Lawyer’s Role: 
Korea’s Dilemma, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 119, 123 (Philip 
S. C. Lewis ed., 1994). 
56 Letter from Minbyun member M281206 to author (Dec. 28, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
57 PARK, supra note 47, at 159-160. 
58 Correspondence with Minbyun member M281206 (Dec. 28, 2006) (on file with 
author). 
59 Letter from Minbyun officer M130407A to author (Apr. 13, 2007) (on file with 
author).  
60 Korean Bar Association, http://www.koreanbar.or.kr (last visited May 10, 2009). 
61  This number was calculated based on the 2004 membership directory of 
Minbyun.  MINBYUN-LAWYERS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, HOEWON MYEONGBU 
[MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY] (2004). 
62 This is consistent with findings by Louise Trubek and M. Elizabeth Kransberger 
who remind us that public interest lawyers can be found across the divide of public 
interest and private law practice. Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical 
Lawyers: Social Justice and the Structures of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING, 
supra note 5, at 201, 201. 
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private-practice lawyers work on citizen campaigns or public interest 
issues without having membership in Minbyun.
63
  For that matter, not 
every lawyer who is a Minbyun member necessarily works consistently 
on public interest issues.  As mentioned earlier, some merely pay dues 
and contribute little else to the association.
64
  Minbyun lawyers range in 
motivation, practice site, and time actually spent on pro bono activities.  
This became more evident as they migrated to different causes in the 
early 1990s. 
 
V. PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERS AS INSTITUTION BUILDERS 
 
 Public interest lawyers have different opportunities and priorities 
when fighting against an authoritarian regime that restricts basic human 
rights than when pursuing a variety of causes in a more liberal regime.  
The nature of public interest lawyers shifts with democratic change.  In 
his article on how law checks power in the different branches of 
government and within the legal profession itself, Richard Abel 
summarizes:  “Cause lawyering is most successful when a confident 
government is engaged in social change and most often frustrated when a 
frightened government is desperately scrambling to retain power.”
65
  We 
see these examples worldwide.  Comparing public interest lawyers in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, Daniel Lev writes that “while the cause of 
Indonesian lawyers has been to create a law state [negara hukum], 
complete with an autonomous and effective judiciary, that of Malaysian 
lawyers has been to defend one in place.”
66
  For a study on Latin 
America, Stephen Meili compares public interest lawyering in Argentina 
and Brazil.  He finds that public interest lawyering has been more 
difficult in Argentina, its success depending on factors like the strength 
of grassroots social movements, the level of violent, arbitrary repression 
by the government, and the availability of “financial, intellectual and 
professional support” both domestic and international.
67
   
 
63 I know of several lawyers and many law professors who work on public interest 
cases without membership in Minbyun. 
64 Interview with an active Minbyun member, in Seoul, S. Korea (May 13, 2003) 
(on file with the author). 
65 Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power:  Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in 
CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 5, at 69, 103. 
66 Daniel Lev, Lawyers’ Causes in Indonesia and Malaysia, in CAUSE LAWYERING, 
supra note 5, at 431, 446. 
67 Stephen Meili, Cause Lawyers and Social Movement: A Comparative Perspective 
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 Korea is no exception.  As citizens’ groups and social movements 
blossomed in the 1990s, more lawyers began to migrate to different 
causes.  No longer as concerned about political freedoms, lawyers were 
now able to find more specialized niches in which to work as social 
equity came to the fore in such areas as rights protection for consumers, 
women, prisoners, the disabled and the poor, and in public interest areas 
like the environment and economic justice.   For example, in the wake 
of the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis, attorneys held key leadership 
positions in the high-profile group Citizens’ Coalition for Economic 
Justice (CCEJ).  Environmental organizations like Korea Federation for 
Environmental Movement and Green Korea United created public 
interest law centers.
68
  Other public interest organizations such as the 
YMCA and the Korean Federation of Trade Unions (Minju 9ocheong) 
have teams of legal counsel to push their respective agendas as well.  
But perhaps the most notable citizens’ group is People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD), founded by Park Won-sun, one of the 
initial members of Minbyun, who later also formed Gong-Gam, the first 
public interest law group in South Korea. 
 Voted in public polls as the most influential NGO in Korean society 
for four consecutive years (2002-2005),
69
  PSPD distinguished itself 
from other NGOs by expressing its primary reliance on legal 
mobilization as a reform strategy.
70
  This is not surprising given that 
half of its 16-member steering committee and one-third of its 54-member 
operations committee consisted of lawyers and law professors, with the 
rest being other professionals like doctors, journalists, social scientists, 
religious leaders, and full-time activists.
71
  Furthermore, nearly every 
 
on Democratic Change in Argentina and Brazil, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 5, at 
487, 511-12. 
68
 CHA BYEONG-JIK, NGO WA BEOP [NGOS AND LAW] 182 (2002). 
69 2005 Hanguk, nuga umjigi-neun-ga [Who’s Moving in Korea 2005?], SISA J., Oct. 
25, 2005, at 60. 
70  Hong Il-pyo, Chamyeoyeondae undong bangsikui guseonggwa byeonhwa 
[Formation and Transformation of PSPD’s Movement Method], in CHAMYEO WA 
YEONDAERO YEON MINJUJUUI UI SAE JIPYEONG:  CHAMYEO YEONDAE CHANGSEOL 10 JU-
NYEON GI-NYEOM NONMUNJIP [NEW HORIZON FOR CITIZENS PAVED BY PARTICIPATION AND 
SOLIDARITY:  10-YEAR ANNIVERSARY ESSAY COLLECTION OF PEOPLE’S SOLIDARITY FOR 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY] 107, 118-121 (Hong Seong-tae ed., 2004). 
71  CHAMYEOYEONDAE [PEOPLE’S SOLIDARITY FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY], 
CHAMYEOYEONDAE 10 NYEONUI GIROK, 1994-2004:  SESANG EUL BAKKUNEUN SIMIN UI 
HIM [PEOPLE’S SOLIDARITY FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 10-YEAR RECORD, 1994-
2004:  THE POWER OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THE WORLD] 17, 37 (2004). 
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subcommittee of PSPD had at least one lawyer as a volunteer.  By 1999, 
116 lawyers were volunteering their services for PSPD.
72
  With lawyers 
at the helm, PSPD was aggressive about resorting to legal measures—
such as litigation, legislative petitioning, opinion letter writing, 
consulting, and legal awareness-raising—for reform agendas such as 
improving social welfare laws, protecting minority shareholders rights 
within jaebeol conglomerate structures, and a myriad of other causes 
such as government transparency, citizen consumer rights, and tax reform 
issues.
73
  The caveat here is that legal mobilization was not the single 
campaign method upon which PSPD relied.  PSPD lawyers and staff 
pursue a sophisticated combination of legal and non-legal means to raise 
social awareness, such as a multi-pronged approach using not only 
litigation but also legislative petitioning, conferences, demonstrations, 
lobbying and media (including internet) campaigns.
74
  This is consistent 
with patterns elsewhere in the world.  Public interest lawyers in the 
United States involved in various movements “repeatedly talked about 
litigation as an ancillary tactic that was most effective in tandem with 
other movement efforts, as one dimension in a larger strategic approach 
to reform politics.”
75
  Activist Randy Shaw and more recently McCann 
also recognize the benefits of legal activism as a complementary measure 
to achieve social causes.
76
  In interviews by McCann and Helena 
Silverstein, activists and lawyers attested that litigation, whether won or 
lost, is important for consciousness-raising and for leveraging purposes 
in alternative dispute resolution.
77
  This research also supports the fact 
that public interest lawyers are not out to push litigation as the only 
effective means of social reform and that they are more sophisticated in 
 
72 PARK, supra note 47, at 533. 
73 See generally the PSPD blog, http://blog.peoplepower21.org/English (last visited 
May 10, 2009) (describing PSPD’s various achievements and projects); see also Hong, 
supra note 70, at 121 (describing PSPD’s founding philosophy of using the law and the 
legal system as a means of social activism). 
74 Hong, supra note 70, at 118. 
75 Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”:  A 
Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE 
LAWYERING, supra note 5, at 261, 267. 
76 Id. at 261; see generally RANDY SHAW, THE ACTIVIST’S HANDBOOK:  A PRIMER 
196-211 (1996) (discussing when resort to litigation can further social causes). 
77 McCann & Silverstein, supra note 75, at 267.  For a more intensive study of the 
effects of legal mobilization, see generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY 
EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994) (discussing case study 
of legal mobilization in pay equity context). 
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knowing when or when not to employ legal strategies.
78
 
 Extensive legal mobilization as a strategy within PSPD leads us to 
another phenomenon, that of institutional isomorphism, or the pattern of 
an organization becoming similar to another organization upon which it 
depends.
79
  We can see that this has happened in South Korea as some 
citizen advocacy groups began to take on the characteristics of the legal 
profession.
80
  Using the example of PSPD, with lawyers leading, 
citizens’ organizations rely on more legal, formalistic measures to 
accomplish their goals, whether by way of legislative petitioning, 
legislative drafting, or litigation.  This occurrence speaks to whether 
lawyer participation takes away creative alternatives from citizen 
advocacy groups.  However, institutional isomorphism can work both 
ways.  Is it social activists who come to resemble lawyers, or lawyers 
who begin to resemble social activists?  Public interest lawyers are a 
creative, critical minority, who work very closely with citizen advocacy 
groups to campaign and litigate vigorously on rights protection for the 
accused women, workers, consumers, minority shareholders as well as 
on other issues like environmental protection, information disclosure and 
social welfare.  While citizens’ groups need lawyers’ legal skills to 
petition the legislature, draft laws, and otherwise ensure procedural 
checks on the legal processes of governmental and business institutions 
in preventing abuse of citizens’ rights, public interest lawyers are not 
confined to legal functions.  Public interest lawyers do much more than 
litigate and negotiate:  They are simultaneously activists, board 
members, organizational managers, fundraisers and street protesters.
81
  
They spend “their time actively generating movement publicity, rallying 
existing or potential movement supporters, coalition building, and 
political strategizing.”
82
  The distinction is not always so clear when, for 
instance, lawyers of an NGO assert that they identify themselves first as 
 
78 McCann & Silverstein, supra note 75, at 267. 
79 See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE 
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 66-76 (1991) (giving definition 
and background on isomorphism). 
80 In one informal discussion with a PSPD staff member in 2004, the member said 
that he and others questioned whether they, as non-lawyers, were becoming too “legal” 
and less “creative” in their thinking and campaigning.  Interview with a PSPD staff 
member, in Seoul, S. Korea (Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with the author). 
81 PARK, supra note 47, at 540-41. 
82 McCann & Silverstein, supra note 76, at 261, 270. 
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activists, and second as lawyers.  Park Won-sun had said, “I am an 
activist first, a lawyer second.”
83
 
 With the emergence of civil society in South Korea, public interest 
lawyers and NGOs have aligned themselves with each other to mobilize 
their resources for their agendas.  Throughout the 1990s particularly, 
with civil society wielding a greater voice vis-à-vis the state, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) like PSPD and environmental 
groups like KFEM and Green Korea United gained more institutional 
legitimacy.  With leaders on board, including attorneys, academics and 
other policy consultants, NGOs like these have become “power elite[s] in 
Korean politics.”
84
 
 Thus, we see that public interest lawyers are in fact much more than 
just lawyers.  They are institution builders and networkers.  Dezalay 
and Garth speak of a group of private lawyers in South America as 
“opportunistic institution builders.”
85
  Though they assign this label to 
ambitious corporate lawyers who profit from building their contacts and 
client rosters, the concept of “opportunistic institution building” is not 
too far off the mark for public interest lawyers as well.  This is in fact 
consistent with the notion of professionalization, which Magali Larson 
describes as “the process by which producers of special services sought 
to constitute and control a market for their expertise,” adding that 
professionalization is also a “collective assertion of special social status 
and a collective process of upward social mobility.”
86
  Although the 
concept of professionalization can be easily applied to the legal 
profession as a whole, it can arguably still apply to a section of the legal 
profession, be they lawyers working in the private or public sector.  All 
of this is to say that public interest lawyers operate in the interest of 
themselves and their organizations, in particular where their self-interest 
and NGO causes intersect but also in terms of prioritizing organization 
survival.
87
  The concepts of institution building and professionalization 
 
83 Interview with Park Won-sun, in Seoul, S. Korea (May 8, 2004). 
84 Lee Jae-Hyup, 9egotiating Values and Law:  Environmental Dispute Resolution 
in Korea, in LEGAL REFORM IN KOREA, supra note 19, at 199, 211. 
85 See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE 
WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN 
STATES 198-219 (2002) (discussing corporate law firms in Latin America). 
86  MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS, at xvi (1977). 
87  See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY:  PERSPECTIVES ON 
PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 204 (1986) (stating that activist professionals act in pursuit 
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may subvert the common idea of public interest lawyers as altruistic, 
social heroes, but it offers a more balanced view of public interest 
lawyers and their activities overall. 
 As civil society gains more political power, so too do its members, 
including public interest lawyers.  Hence, lawyers once called 
“dissident,” who are elite by virtue of passing the bar, have actually 
attained greater status within the sector of civil society.  This has 
become especially true as they became leaders of citizen movement 
organizations.  Minbyun lawyers helped to legitimize citizen movement 
groups with their professional status and expertise.
88
  This type of social 
empowerment often led to political opportunities for Minbyun lawyers to 
enter government positions.  
 
VI. “HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS” TURNED LAWYER-STATESPERSONS
89
 
 
 Although South Korea has had lawyers serve in executive capacity in 
the past,
90
 the influx of public interest lawyers into state positions came 
with the election of a former Minbyun labor lawyer, Roh Moo-hyun, in 
2002.  Previously, very few lawyers worked outside the judicial branch 
in executive or legislative capacity but today lawyers are found across all 
governmental branches.  In 2003, 38 of the 269-member National 
Assembly were licensed attorneys, representing 14% of all assembly 
members.
91
  More recently, in February 2005, the number of licensed 
attorneys still numbered about 34 out of the 299-member National 
 
of prestige, for self-interests and for sake of attracting sustainable funding sources). 
88 For a discussion of how professionals contribute to social movements, see 
generally id. at 56. 
89 A lawyer-statesman is generally understood to mean one who is both a lawyer 
and a government leader, as often described in the case of American figures Samuel 
Adams, Patrick Henry and Abraham Lincoln.  Former dean of the Yale Law School, 
Anthony Kronman, expands upon the literal definition, defining the lawyer-statesman not 
in terms of working in official state capacity but as someone who should embody the 
morals of a noble doer.  ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3-4 (1993).  Because Kronman addresses the American legal 
profession and its characteristics specifically, I refrain from using his conceptualization in 
South Korea’s case and instead use the conventional definition, with the single exception 
that I use the term “lawyer-statesperson” for gender neutrality. 
90 For example, former Prime Minister and current politician Lee Hoi-chang was 
also a lawyer.  JRTI graduates who work for the state in capacity of judges and 
prosecutors are commonly known as governmental lawyers (Beopgwan). 
91 Choi, supra note 17, at 176 n.6. 
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Assembly, or 11%.
92
 
 Representing a liberal reformist party and critical of the US-Korean 
alliance, Roh Moo-hyun had the backing of many progressive NGOs and 
the broad support of a younger generation of South Koreans, starting 
with the “386 generation” (people in their thirties who graduated in the 
eighties and were born in the sixties), many of whom had protested 
against the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-
hwan.  Once in office, President Roh proceeded to fill top government 
posts with close colleagues who were also Minbyun lawyers, for 
example, Ko Yeong-ku as head of the National Intelligence Service and 
Kang Keum-sil as the first female Minister of Justice, thereby drastically 
raising the profile of Minbyun. 
 In 1999, Park Won-sun had critiqued the inward-looking nature of 
Minbyun and urged its membership to reach out more aggressively to the 
community.
93
  At the time, nobody really expected the Minbyun to reach 
into the state to the extent that it did in the early 2000s.  Media reports 
paint a picture of Minbyun as having a huge role in the reformist make-
up of Roh’s administration.
94
  Meanwhile, the movement of Minbyun 
lawyers into the government precipitated an identity crisis for Minbyun:  
though founded in opposition to the government, Minbyun now had 
members heading the state.  This left Minbyun scrambling to 
differentiate itself from the administration.  Despite Minbyun lawyers 
assuming top state posts, some legal activists are skeptical about the 
influence lawyer-statespersons have considering that their identities 
become more aligned with those of government bureaucrats than of 
lawyers.
95
  The new criticism was that it was no longer Minbyun, but 
Gwanbyeon;
96
 because “gwan” stands for “government,” the implication 
is that these are lawyers who act on behalf of the government instead of 
citizens. 
 
92 Yi Min-cheong, Na gukhoe-uiwon-i-ya byeonhosaya? [Are You My 9ational 
Assembly Representative or a Lawyer?], OHMYNEWS, July 25, 2005, available at 
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000270367 
(last visited May 10, 2009). 
93 PARK, supra note 47, at 541-42. 
94  See, e.g., Kim Kyung-ho, Lawyers’ Group “Brain Pool” for Roh, KOREA 
HERALD, Mar. 28, 2003 (discussing various high level Minbyun members in Roh 
administration). 
95 Interview with an active Minbyun member, in Seoul, S. Korea (May 13, 2003). 
96 Ahn Kyeong-hwan, Jo Yeong-nae Pyeongjeon [A Critical Biography of Jo Yeong-
nae] 296 (2006). 
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 The dynamics between lawyers and the state have changed on 
several levels.  Having lawyer-statespersons in government has raised 
the visibility of activist lawyers in general and helped to build 
cooperative networks between government and civil society, but 
cooptation and conflict exist too.  Lawyer-statespersons are co-opted in 
that their identity becomes more state official than lawyer, while their 
status as lawyers is no guarantee to garner respect within or outside the 
government by other legal professionals or state officials in general.  
For instance, President Roh’s nominations for the head of National 
Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Justice were highly controversial 
because of the reformist agenda or ideological positions of the 
candidates.  When President Roh nominated Ko Yeong-ku, National 
Assembly members criticized his views and past actions such as 
rewriting the National Security Law and campaigning to release a North 
Korean spy in 1992 when working as a human rights lawyer.
97
 
 The nomination of Kang Keum-sil also provoked heated debate.  
Because the Ministry of Justice works on the strict basis of seniority for 
positions, the appointment of a younger, junior-level woman appalled 
many senior prosecutors who threatened resignation en masse.
98
  A 
dozen did quit upon her assuming the minister title, but the inner 
rebellion eventually quelled when Kang agreed to consult with the 
Prosecutor General on other appointments within the Ministry of 
Justice.
99
  As Kang’s appointment demonstrates, it is not easy to reform 
government practices, especially of those as tradition-bound as the rank-
and-file prosecutor’s office within the Ministry of Justice.  Additionally, 
this case speaks to internal dissent within the ranks of the legal 
profession:  one of prosecutors (the esteemed governmental lawyer) 
against the de jure neophyte lawyer-statesperson (or de facto “dissident” 
lawyer).  We find that Minbyun lawyers in government are a minority 
and that conservative elements in the governments constrain their 
progressive platforms. 
 The most profound shake-up is that once-dissident attorneys helped 
to lead the state under Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency.  When the liberal 
 
97 Hwang Jang-jin, 9IS 9ominee Upholds Revised Security Law, KOREA HERALD, 
Apr. 23, 2003. 
98 Kim Kyung-ho, Prosecutors Oppose ‘Junior, Liberal’ Minister, KOREA HERALD, 
Feb. 22, 2003. 
99 Soh Ji-young, Prosecutors Divided Over Challenge to Seniority System, KOREA 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003.  
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Yeollin Uri party displaced the conservative Grand National Party as 
majority in the National Assembly in 2004, this presented the once 
dissident lawyer in a whole new light:  as lawyer-statesperson.  
Previously, “human rights” attorneys were diametrically opposed to an 
authoritarian state; however, public interest lawyers are now within the 
state and tend to cooperate with the liberal reformist government.  This 
has had certain repercussions on the condition of public interest 
lawyering. 
 
VII. THE CHANGING NATURE OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING:  
THE LAST FIVE YEARS 
 
 Public interest lawyering changed under the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration in two distinct ways:  first, protest litigation by PSPD 
dropped drastically after 2004; second, a different set of lawyers began to 
adopt legal measures to counteract the reformist policies of the Roh 
administration. 
 Interviews with PSPD and Minbyun members help to shed light on 
how the dynamics of public interest lawyering began to change.  PSPD 
filed a combination of 10 lawsuits and criminal charges in 2005, four in 
2006, and three lawsuits in 2007, totaling only 16 in a three-year period 
compared to its active litigation schedule of years past (194 cases during 
1994-2004).
100
  PSPD and Minbyun members attribute this to several 
reasons:  One of the original PSPD members answered simply, “Gong-
Gam,” as the reason for the decline in PSPD litigation.
101
  Park Won-
sun had created the public interest law firm, Gong-Gam, in 2002 under 
the auspices of the charity Beautiful Foundation, which he founded after 
leaving PSPD.  One former PSPD attorney said that cases had recently 
started to be funneled to Gong-Gam, a “cousin” of PSPD, and that 
litigation had declined since “most of the test cases have resulted in an 
outcome” and that other advocacy methods have taken on a bigger 
 
100 Interview with P090407, Apr. 9, 2007, Seoul, S. Korea.  See also Sosong 
Jaryoshil [Litigation Archives] at the PSPD website, available at 
http://www.peoplepower21.org/?sub=sue (last visited May 10, 2009) (listing cases). 
101 Interview with LP100407, Seoul, S. Korea, Apr. 10, 2007 (on file with author).  
As one Public Interest Law Center staff explained, “Litigation has reduced very much.  
PSPD used to push more litigation, but now there is less because Gong-Gam takes cases 
and also NGOs resort to litigation themselves.”  Interview with P090407, Seoul, S. 
Korea, Apr. 9, 2007 (on file with author). 
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role.
102
  Two other Minbyun members echoed that while PSPD and its 
lawyers started with test cases, PSPD is now concentrating more on 
policy-oriented measures and probably will continue to do so into the 
future.
103
    A Public Interest Law Center staff member, alluding 
mainly to the departure of lawyers who had originally established PSPD, 
contemplated that “it has been ten years since PSPD started.  There is a 
different generation of lawyers now. . . . Maybe PSPD is at fault for not 
knowing what to do next” in terms of legal strategizing.
104
 
 These comments and observations evidence a marked departure from 
the busy litigating schedule of PSPD during the 1990s.  The early 2000s 
appears to be a crucial turning point with the emergence of Gong-Gam, 
but the comments about less test cases and pursuing policy-oriented 
measures versus court litigation signify that there are more legislative 
and administrative access points with the government to pursue 
initiatives on an implementation level, such as by having PSPD members 
sit on various government committees.  Implicit is that there are now 
methods to communicate with the current administration without having 
to resort to courtroom battles.  This pattern signifies a maturation of the 
legal mobilization process such that matters are not just litigated for 
purposes visibility and the occasional victory, but for follow-through on 
policy implementation with the more reformist administration in power 
since 2002.  
 Meanwhile, this more liberal government has caused severe backlash 
from conservative forces.  The most obvious attack came in the form of 
impeachment against President Roh for party-biased statements in 
violation of the Constitution.
105
  Backlash also came from conservative 
groups within the legal profession. A new coalition of lawyers, Lawyers 
with Citizens (Simin gwa hamkkeha-neun byeonhosadeul, or Si-byeon), 
formed officially on January 25, 2005 with the aim of monitoring and 
criticizing government policies.
106
  Starting off with about 40 lawyers 
 
102 Interview with M130407, Seoul, S. Korea, Apr. 13, 2007 (on file with author). 
103 Interview with M130407b, Seoul, S. Korea, Apr. 13, 2007 (on file with author).  
Interview with LP110407, Seoul, S. Korea, Apr. 11, 2007 (on file with author). 
104 Interview with P090407, supra note 101. 
105 While the Constitutional Court found that President Roh’s statements violated 
the Constitutional prohibition against siding with political parties while in office, the 
Court decided that his actions were not grave enough to impeach him from office.  
Impeachment of the President (Roh Moo-hyun) Case, 16-1 KCCR 609, 657-58, 2004 
Hun-Na 1 (May 14, 2004). 
106  Agenda Research Group, Lawyers with Citizens, AGENDANET available at 
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and with current membership of 150, Lawyers with Citizens was 
especially active in organizing constitutional litigation against the 
executive bid to relocate the administrative capital of Seoul to 
Chungcheong Province in 2003.
107
  Lawyers with Citizens also filed a 
constitutional suit in July 2007 protesting the government move to 
reduce media press rooms within government offices as a violation of the 
public’s right to know the goings-on of the government.
108
  In 
September 2007, Lawyers with Citizens threatened to sue Cheongwadae 
(Blue House) for election violations in reaction to Cheongwadae’s filing 
a slander suit against Lee Myung-bak, the opposition party’s presidential 
candidate at the time and current President of South Korea.
109
  Minbyun 
lawyers have claimed that Lawyers with Citizens is “a political 
organization,” suspicious of the notion that it could qualify as a public 
interest law advocacy group.
110
  This may seem an apt description 
considering that the activities of Lawyers with Citizens so far are to 
combat any new unilateral moves by the executive branch. 
 Lawyers with Citizens also symbolizes a new trend with respect to 
public interest lawyering:  while Korean public interest lawyers have 
traditionally been progressive lawyers struggling against the state, this is 
no longer the case.  Even conservative groups of lawyers now use the 
powerful language of “citizens” to present themselves as representatives 
or agents of the general public interest as opposed to merely the interests 
of the select elite.  For example, the use of name “Lawyers with 
Citizens” implies that lawyers are acting on behalf of citizen interests.  
Public interest lawyering is no longer in the domain of Minbyun 
members only.  There has been a shift in ideology, such that now any 
group of lawyers disagreeing with the incumbent administration can use 
 
http://agendanet.co.kr/zb41pl7/bbs/view.php?id=pol_sub1&no=37 (last visited May 10, 
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Citizens “We’ll Take to the Streets”], THE DAILIAN, Jan. 26, 2006, available at 
http://www.dailian.co.kr/news/n_view.html?id=31402 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
107 Relocation of the Capital City Case, 16-2(B) KCCR 1, 2004 Hun-Ma 554, 566 
(consolidated) (Oct. 21, 2004). 
108 Lawyers File Appeal on Government’s Press Room Reform, KBS WORLD RADIO, 
July 10, 2007, available at http://english.kbs.co.kr/news/newsview_sub.php? 
key=2007071021 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
109 See generally Editorial, Cheong Wa Dae and “Fuss Marketing,” DONG-A ILBO, 
Sept. 7, 2007, available at http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid= 
2007090762998 (last visited May 10, 2009) (criticizing Cheongwadae for filing lawsuit 
and calling for post-election prosecutorial investigation). 
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the law to challenge the state.  No matter what their political 
background, lawyers who find themselves at odds with the state can 
mobilize the law as a weapon to fight the state.  
 Still, challenges remain.  Public interest law in South Korea has 
strong political overtones.  Minbyun lawyers have traditionally 
dominated the field of public interest law due to a history of fighting 
human rights abuses perpetrated by state and businesses in collusion.  
Minbyun lawyers gained in reputation by aligning with strong citizen 
movement groups, but the election of Roh Moo-hyun as president and 
other Minbyun members in political office forced a re-questioning of 
Minbyun’s priorities and seeming alliance with the government.  With 
groups like PSPD waning on the legal front and others like Lawyers with 
Citizens forming to protest government policies, one quickly realizes that 
public interest lawyering is not ideologically linear.  The question that 
looms for the Korean legal profession, however, is how to reinforce the 
concept of public interest lawyering as more of a professional ethic of 
legal service rather than as a publicly perceived political tool.  This task 
appears to lie with the new graduate law school system in training a new 
corps of legal professionals. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 The nature of public interest lawyers has changed drastically in the 
past twenty years in South Korea.  An exploration of the legal 
profession shows that, on the whole, lawyers make up an elite class.  
Traditionally, judges and prosecutors were the crème de la crème, with 
few lawyers entering private practice.  Judges and prosecutors were 
extensions of state authority, while private lawyers mainly worked on 
client-based matters.  Meanwhile, the handful of lawyers who devoted 
themselves to public causes in opposition to the existing administration 
were deemed “dissidents.”  These activist lawyers faced difficulty 
acting as effective agents of civil society considering the authoritarian 
rule during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, and the relatively weak 
position of citizens’ groups. 
 Although public interest lawyers have been a minority within the 
legal profession, they are not necessarily undersized with respect to their 
influence on society and politics.  A transformation took place 
throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s as social movements became 
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stronger and the transition to democracy progressed.  Citizen advocacy 
groups became powerful through alliances and with support from 
professionals.  Public interest lawyers became instrumental leaders 
within NGOs.  As citizens’ groups gained greater political power, public 
interest lawyers were no longer “dissident” but now more socially and 
politically elite than ever before, helping to usher lawyer-statespersons 
into executive and parliamentary positions.  With greater social and 
political empowerment coming from the growing strength of civil 
society, public interest lawyers in South Korea have transitioned from 
being dissidents to effective institution builders, advancing their causes 
and developing the practice of public interest law in the span of two 
decades. 
